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Where legal systems and market forces enforce contracts inadequately, vertical integration can circumvent
these transaction difficulties.  But, such environments often also feature highly interventionist government,
and even corruption.  Vertical integration might then enhance returns to political rent-seeking aimed
at securing and extending market power.  Thus, where political rent seeking is minimal, vertical integration
should add to firm value and economy performance; but where political rent seeking is substantial,
firm value might rise as economy performance decays. China offers a suitable background for empirical
examination of these issues because her legal and market institutions are generally weak, but nonetheless
exhibit substantial province-level variation.  Vertical integration is more common where legal institutions
are weaker and where regional governments are of lower quality or more interventionist.  In such provinces,
firms led by insiders with political connections are more likely to be vertically integrated. Vertical
integration is negatively associated with firm value if the top corporate insider is politically connected,
but weakly positively associated with public share valuations if the politically connected firm is independently
audited.  Finally, provinces whose vertical integrated firms tend to have politically unconnected CEOs
exhibit elevated per capita GDP growth, while provinces whose vertically integrated firms tend to
have political insiders as CEOs exhibit depressed per capita GDP growth.
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This paper explores the relationship of vertical integration to institutional development and its 
impact on firm and economy wide performance. We define vertical integration as common 
control over adjacent production stages. In an economy with perfect markets – that is, with no 
transactions costs – vertical integration is intrinsically inefficient because it prevents 
specialization and creates intra-organizational complexity and politics (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1988). However, a variety of convincing reasons can explain vertical integration in real 
economies. 
First, transactions costs in dealings between suppliers and customers can induce vertical 
integration.  Well known information asymmetries and agency problems can induce anticipatable 
opportunistic behaviour, and so distort investment.  If legal institutions and market forces are too 
dysfunctional to let firms contract around such transactions problems, vertical integration is a 
plausible solution (Williamson, 1975; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Khanna and Palepu, 
1999).   
Second, weak legal institutions and market disciplinary forces can reflect underlying 
political economy infirmities – such as excessive regulatory burdens, political interference, or 
corruption – that can hinder market transactions. Vertical integration can be a rational response 
to circumvent such bureaucratic impediments and secure e.g. reliable factor supplies (Stigler, 
1951).  But this need not end the story, for such economies induce political rent seeking 
(Krueger, 1976).  If regulatory burdens, political interference, or even corruption become 
important factors in day-to-day business, firms invest resources in influencing them by 
“lawyering up”, lobbying, or even bribing influential public officials.  Once firms acquire the 
ability to influence government officials, lobbying for regulatory or other barriers to competition   3
is a natural use of such influence (Tullock, 1965).  Vertical integration reflects the expansion of a 
rent-seeker’s boundaries. In addition, a vertically integrated monopoly is unambiguously more 
profitable than a sequence of vertically related single-market monopolies (Spengler, 1950).  
Third, ineffectual shareholder rights can induce vertical integration.  In many countries, 
corporate insiders derive substantial private benefits from controlling large listed firms, or 
groups of listed firms (Dyck and Zinglaes, 2004; Nenova, 2003).  Expanding into an unfamiliar 
industry, as in vertical integration, causes US firms’ valuations to fall and appears motivated by 
insiders’ private objectives (Jensen, 1986; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).  Firms spanning 
many industries are more complex and opaque than one-industry firms, and their insiders are 
consequently better shielded from outside investors monitoring and control (Lang and Stulz, 
1994).  This builds a circumstantial case that insiders intent on magnified private benefits might, 
all else equal, favour more extensive diversification, including more vertically integration.
1   
  All three of these effects may well act in concert.  The relationship observed between the 
extent of vertical integration and firm or economy performance should thus depend on which 
effect dominates under what circumstances.   
In China, both courts and market forces are often regarded as ineffective. If vertical 
integration primarily occurs to overcome such transactions problems, more extensive vertical 
integration should correlate with more prosperous firms and a more prosperous economy.  But 
China’s economy is also burdened with corruption and political rent-seeking. If vertical 
integration primarily serves to magnify the rents politically connected firms extract from state-
sanctioned market power, more extensive vertical integration should correlate with more 
                                                 
1 Firms operating in many industries exhibit depressed valuations (Lang and Stulz, 1994) and, although reverse 
causation is certainly possible too (Villalonga, 2004), diversifying takeovers unambiguously reduce acquirer 
valuations (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990) and divesting non-core operations unambiguously raises divestor 
valuations (Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997).      4
prosperous firms and a less prosperous economy.  Finally, China provides public shareholders 
scant protection from abusive insiders, who can divert wealth from their firms to themselves as 
long as they are sufficiently discrete and avoid political missteps.  If such diversions are larger in 
more diversified firms, including more vertically integrated ones, their elevated profits could 
accrue primarily to insiders, and their performance could appear poor to outsiders.  This adds a 
further wrinkle to detecting the consequences of vertical integration in Chinese data.   
Empirical studies of vertical integration predominantly examine a given industry in a 
given developed economy for vertical integration as a response to expected opportunistic 
behavior (Teece, 1976; Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Masten, 1984; Mulherin, 1986; Joskow, 
1987; Ohanian, 1994; Chipty, 2001; and others).
2  Relatively few studies test for a link between 
vertical integration and economy-level performance, and even fewer examine vertical integration 
in developing economies.  Yet these are precisely where legal systems and market forces are 
known to be especially problematic (De Soto, 2000).  Studies of vertical integration in such 
economies – where contracting solutions are unreliable, political rent-seeking is rife, and 
corporate governance is largely unsupervised by shareholders – should provide the most 
powerful evidence of its economic functions.
3   
A notable exception is Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2005), who use cross-country 
data to show that vertical integration is significantly greater in countries with higher contracting 
costs yet greater financial market development.  Cross-country studies, though immensely 
valuable, are unavoidably vulnerable to omitted variable problems, as well as data comparability 
                                                 
2  For a recent survey, see Lafontaine and Slade (2007).   
3  Parallel concepts are investigated in the foreign direct investment literature, which finds that multinational firms 
prefer full ownership (i.e., integration) of their foreign subsidiaries where transaction difficulties intrinsic to the 
nature of the business are high (e.g., Henisz, 2000).  Unfortunately, such studies shed scant light on integration as a 
response to weak legal or market institutions because confounding interpretations arise.  For example, foreign and 
domestic firms have different capabilities for dealing with a wide range of institutional infirmities beyond weak 
legal and market institutions. These differences constrain their roles as acquirers and acquired (see e.g. Feenstra and 
Hanson, 2005).    5
and measurement problems.
4  For example, innumerable latent factors linked to culture, history, 
politics, or even language can affect human behavior and hence the organization of the economy 
as well as institutional development.     
Studying province-level data from China mitigates these criticisms, at least to some 
extent; for these factors are largely common across provinces.  Due to variation in proximity to 
the outside world and in pre-liberalization conditions, different provinces now stand at 
substantially different levels of institutional development.  By Western standards, legal systems 
throughout China seem sclerotic, political rent-seeking looks rampant, and state control seems 
pervasive (Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995; Che and Qian, 1998; Allen, Qian and Qian, 
2005; Cull and Xu, 2005; Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007). But these problems are much worse in 
some provinces than in others (Qian and Weingast, 1996, 1997). Against a common cultural 
background, this variation in institutional development provides a useful laboratory for exploring 
how businesses organize themselves in response to their institutional environments.     
We use China’s input–output (IO) table to measure the prevalence of vertical integration 
among listed firms (excluding public utilities and financial firms) in each of China’s various 
provinces, special administrative regions, and autonomous regions – which we collectively call 
“provinces” for brevity.
5  Controlling for potential asset specificity (Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979) and other plausible factors, we find vertical integration more 
common in regions with weaker legal systems, worse local government, and less developed 
market economies.  We interpret this as consistent with vertical integration as a corrective 
                                                 
4 For example, industries that are vertically related in the United States might not be elsewhere, where different 
technologies require different inputs. Also, contracting costs measure, to be comparable, must be simple – for 
example “the number of steps required in collecting a debt.”  Yet, a similar step might be more onerous in one legal 
system than another. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2005) find meaningful results despite such challenges.  
5 This methodology was developed by Fan and Lang (2000), and used by Acemoglu et al. (2004); Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Mitton (2005); Shahrur (2005); and Fan and Goyal (2006).    6
measure to circumvent institutional lacuna, a manifestation of political rent seeking, or a screen 
to obscure insiders’ self-dealing.   
From biographical information, we define each firm’s top executives, whom we call 
CEOs regardless of their Chinese titles, as apparatchiks if they are now or have ever been 
Communist Party of state officials.  We find apparatchik-run firms to be unusually prone to 
vertically integration. Moreover, vertical integration by non-apparatchik-run firms is weakly 
positively associated with stock market valuations; but a negative association emerges for 
apparatchik-run firms. However, even in apparatchik-run firms, vertical integration is positively 
linked to elevated firm value in firms subject to a “Big Four” auditor. These results are consistent 
with at least some vertical integration arising to expand returns to political rent-seeking, and with 
connected insiders appropriating less of these returns in more transparent firms.     
Finally, we average the extent of vertical integration across all firms based in a given 
province, to construct province-level measures of the prevalence of vertical integration.   More 
prevalent vertical integration accompanies higher provincial per capita GDP levels and growth 
rates in provinces whose vertically integrated firms are predominantly run by non-apparatchiks.  
In contrast, more widespread vertical integration accompanies lower per capita GDP levels and 
growth rates in provinces whose vertically integrated firms are predominantly apparatchik-run.  
We interpret these findings as consistent with vertical integration creating value where it 
overcomes institutional deficiencies, but destroying value where it aggravates the negative 
consequences of political rent-seeking.   
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
the sample, discusses empirical measures, and provides descriptive statistics. Our main results 
are reported in section 4. Section 5 and 6 investigate how vertical integration correlates with   7
performance at the firm and the economy level, respectively.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.   The Economics of Vertical Integration  
This section discusses likely determinants of vertical integration and their impacts on firm value.  
By vertical integration, we do not mean the simple integration of closely related production 
activities, like the washing and then pressing of clothes.  Rather, we mean the integration of 
activities belonging to distinctly identifiable separate industries.  To illustrate, consider Weiqiao 
Group, the largest textile company in China.  The group’s primary business is producing textiles.  
But it also grows its own cotton, makes the cotton into yarn, weaves and fabricates the yarn into 
textiles, imprints the textiles with colors before selling them to customers, and operates its own 
electricity plant to power its other operations.  Weiqiao exemplifies a degree of vertical 
integration commonplace in China, but rare in developed market economies.  What are likely 
explanations and economic implications?  
 
2.1.   Transaction costs and vertical integration  
Market transactions between separately run vertically related firms can be costly.  Coase (1937) 
posits that transactions occur within a firm (vertical integration) if the cost of arm’s length 
transactions between specialized firms exceeds that of coordinating multiple activities within one 
firm.  Coase’s insight begat an influential literature on the costs of transactions between 
vertically related businesses (e.g., Williamson, 1973, 1975; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; 
and Lucas, 1978).       
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1979) point out that anticipated 
opportunistic behavior stemming from asset specificity, low transactions frequency, and   8
uncertainty associated with the transactions in question leads to inefficiency.  Consider two 
independent units engaging in upstream and downstream production, each making a specialized 
investment in period one to prepare for production in period two.  Once an investment is made, 
the resulting asset cannot be used for another purpose without a substantial loss in its value.  This 
cost of adapting the asset to other uses, called asset specificity, can induce the other transacting 
party to extract rents ex post – to demand a change in the terms of the transaction terms in its 
favor.  This sort of opportunistic behavior is possible because of an information asymmetry 
around the transaction – either a genuinely exogenous unanticipated change or a calculated rent-
extraction.  This foreseeable possibility induces time-inconsistent behavior that reduces the 
expected return to specialized investment, and therefore curtails it, resulting in a deadweight loss 
to the economy. 
Another source of inefficiency arises because the value of one vertically related business 
can depend on the other – on its effort level and flexibility as well as its willingness to share 
information and to coordinate employment and investment strategies.   
If these inefficiencies are large, integrating the vertically related firms into a single 
company may be less costly than market transactions between separate firms (Coase, 1937).  
Since the costs of arm’s length transactions are due to weak legal systems rendering contracts 
unenforceable, and property rights therefore unprotected, reorganizing the businesses under a 
common owner alleviates these problems.   
Asset specificity, whereby assets in place cannot be reassigned to other uses, and 
uncertainty about the value of contracts are fundamental determinants of transactions costs.   
Asset specificity often depends on access to alternative suppliers and customers.  For example, a 
factory built in a city with inadequate road and rail links to other cities can be at the mercy of   9
local suppliers and customers who demand changes in the terms of contracts.  But a factory in a 
city with efficient transportation links to other cities can do business with more distant suppliers 
or customers if local ones become too irksome.  Of course, if local customers and suppliers can 
be trusted to perform as they have agreed, efficient transportation links are less critical (see, e.g., 
Joskow (1987))  
Thus, our starting point is that a firm is likely to be more vertically integrated, ceteris 
paribus, if its transactions are subject to high performance uncertainty and it is located in a 
region with poor transportation infrastructure.
  
 
2.2.   Institutional determinants of vertical integration 
While integration into a single firm could be a solution to these transaction difficulties, its 
drawback is that extensive vertical integration renounces the benefits of specialization (Smith, 
1776), diluting management’s focus, and even inducing “territorial” political conflicts within the 
company (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988).   
 
The Legal System 
Many transaction difficulties can be avoided if the performance of local customers and suppliers 
can be guaranteed with effective legal contracts that can be enforced quickly, cheaply, and 
reliably.  Contracts that clearly lay out each party’s rights and obligations in each set of 
circumstances can substantially reduce the feasibility and gains from ex post bargaining to 
extract rents.  Reliable contracting can also reduce shirking, stipulate effort, govern information 
sharing, and predetermine degrees of cooperation.  Carefully drafted legal contracts can precisely 
stipulate legal development and prohibit their infringement.  These considerations suggest that   10




Market forces can also discipline opportunistic behaviour, rendering integration unnecessary.  
Highly visible transactions provide market participants information about the behavior of firms 
and their insiders. Importunate shirking, inadequate performance, and disdain for legal 
development all engender bad reputations and warn away future potential business partners.   
Acquiring a reputation as an opportunist, who reneges on promises and manipulates business 
partners, can become a serious liability.  In a free market, where people can choose their business 
partners, any firm that plans to remain a “going-concern” choose to behave reliably and 
honourably (Klein and Leffler, 1981).    
Extensive government intervention can weaken market forces by forcing firms to transact 
with politically favoured firms. For example, heavy-handed regulation in China deters entry into 
the electricity generation business to protect inefficient and unreliable State-owned enterprises. 
These sporadically renege on commitments to supply electricity – perhaps because of simple 
incompetence, or perhaps in attempts to extract bribes for reliable power supplies.  Since no 
alternative power suppliers are permitted, electricity users must accept behaviour that could not 
persist in an open and competitive market for electricity. 
Vertical integration can again provide a way out.  The textiles business discussed above, 
Weiqiao, opted for vertical integration by constructing an in-house electricity plant. The cheapest 
technology operated on a scale larger than Weiqiao required, so the firm found itself with more 
electricity than it needed.  Forbidden from selling power, Weiqiao began refining aluminium to   11
make profitable use of its excess electricity.   
Aluminum smelting is not obviously related to Weiqiao’s core textiles operations, but 
requires vast amounts of electricity.  Sequential vertical integration of this sort can look like 
unrelated diversification, but is not.  Again, the state’s suppression of market forces is 
responsible.  Such multi-stage vertical integration would make no sense had Weiqiao been able 
to sell its surplus electricity.   
In the United States, these considerations are primarily of historical interest.  For 
example, the United States retain wartime price controls on many goods into the early post 
World War II era. Peacetime economic fundamentals left these some of these prices too low to 
cover production costs, and caused firms to cease producing the price-controlled goods.  This left 
downstream users of the price-controlled goods contending with extreme shortages of critical 
inputs.  Since offering higher prices in arm’s length transactions was illegal, customer firms 
merged with their suppliers (Stigler, 1951).  One unit of the vertically integrated firm could then 
compensate the other for its costs without violating the price control laws, since no actual “sale” 
occurred at any specifiable “price”.   
But in 21
st century China, these same considerations arise. Heavy-handed regulation 
induces vertical integration both by undermining market forces that otherwise would encourage 
market transactions between vertically related firms and by inducing distortions that disrupt 
intermediate goods markets. Hence, our third hypothesis is that a firm is more likely to adopt a 
vertical integration strategy where its associated input and/or product markets are heavily 
regulated and/or underdeveloped.   
 
Political Connections   12
Onerous regulations limiting the right to operate a business in China lead to several very 
important additional considerations.  Bureaucrats’ powers to allocate these rights, and to interfere 
in businesses’ operations, foster a specialized class of rent-seeking firms, which gain business 
opportunities by trading favors with bureaucrats and sustain their competitive advantage through 
corporate insiders who also serve as bureaucrats.  The objective functions of these politicized 
firms and their insiders may not correspond to firm value maximization, for the firms may be 
mere stepping stones along career paths through the Party and State bureaucracy. Corporate 
interests might thus be readily sacrificed on political favour trading to move insiders or their 
relatives to higher and more powerful State or Party positions.   
These rent-seeking firms often use their political influence to obtain localized state-
enforced monopolies.  They would then use integration to extend the scope of monopoly power 
by expanding the monopolist’s market power upstream and downstream.  That is, a vertically 
integrated firm might magnify the returns to its investment in political clout by foreclose 
competition in those industries as well.   
Such local monopolists would also opt for vertical integration to avoid “double 
marginalization” (Spengler, 1950).  Double marginalization arises where vertically related 
monopolists fail to internalize the implication of one’s high price on the other’s profits, and 
hence collect less monopoly rent than if they coordinated their action to maximize their joint 
profits.  Contractual arrangements might achieve such coordination, so integration is particularly 
appealing where contracting options are limited (Cabral, 2000).   
State and Party officials might welcome such expanded monopolies.  Corrupt officials 
might cooperate in their establishment for a share of the monopoly rents created, but honest 
officials might also find that dealing with a single firm simplifies social engineering negotiations   13
with the business sector.   
These considerations motivate our fourth hypothesis: the more deeply a firm is connected 
with official bureaucrats, the more vertically integrated is the firm’s business structure.   
 
Good Government 
At a more general level, regulation per se might well matter less than the overall quality of 
government.  A government more rife with bureaucrats intent on extracting rents, collecting 
bribes, or even explicitly expropriating private property would motivate firms to invest more 
heavily in official connections merely to cope.  Moreover such an environment raises the costs of 
market transactions, and thus reinforces firms’ incentives to integrate vertically.  Not only would 
firms with extensive investments in official connections integrate vertically integrate to enhance 
their rent-extraction, but politically unconnected firms would do the same to avoid arm’s length 
transactions in markets rendered dysfunctional by predatory government officials.   
Hence, our fifth hypothesis is that firms are more likely to integrate vertically in regions 
with lower quality government.   
 
Summary 
We thus expect a firm to be more vertically integrated if its managers are politically connected 
and if it lies in a Chinese province or special district characterized by poor quality government, 
weak legal systems, and/or ill-developed markets.
6   
 
2.3.   Vertical integration, firm performance, and economy performance  
                                                 
6 Khanna and Oberholzer-Gee (2005) find that the extent of government interference in each province correlates 
with the existence of large firms.  They argue that either political interference protects incumbents or incumbents 
must attain a certain size to combat interference.   14
Our discussion points to institutional weaknesses of the sorts described above inducing vertical 
integration; yet vertical integration could reflect either efficiency enhancement or rent-seeking, 
or both. Which motive matters more has implications at both the firm and economy levels. 
Regardless of whether integration is for efficiency enhancement or rent-seeking, it 
augments firm-level performance.  However, the distribution of these gains might differ.  In a 
highly corrupt economy, corporate and political insiders might well appropriate most of the gains 
from vertical integration, leaving little for other stakeholders.  In particular, the public 
shareholders of listed vertically integrated firms might see scant benefits.
7  Indeed, to the extent 
that vertical integration renders firms less transparent and monitoring more expensive, public 
shareholders might actually lose on net if the firm diverts more than 100% of the gains from 
integration to these insiders. Only if the firm’s corporate insiders and political connections can 
pre-commit to effective incentive alignment and monitoring would outside shareholders capture 
some of these vertical integration benefits.  
We therefore further hypothesize that firm value rises with vertical integration if the firm 
is not controlled by politically connected insiders.  Indeed, firm valuations in equity markets 
might even correlate negatively with vertical integration if rent extraction by insiders is 
unconstrained.  However, a positive correlation should be evident where incentive and 
monitoring mechanisms constrain wealth extraction by insiders and bureaucrats.   
The extent of firm-level vertical integration also has ambiguous implications for 
economy-wide economic outcomes.  Pervasive vertical integration could be an economically 
rational response to high-cost arm’s length transaction induced by a weak legal system or weak 
                                                 
7 We focus on shareholder valuations because detailed firm-level information is available only for publicly listed 
firms, and because accounting data are unreliable measures of fundamental performance amid weak legal 
institutions.  Shareholder valuations, however, remain a valid measure of public investors’ expectations of the cash 
flows likely to accrue to them.     15
market disciplinary forces; or it could be a rational response to reduce reliance on government 
bureaucracy.  If so, more extensive vertical integration should facilitate greater economic activity 
and accelerate economic growth.  Vertical integration of multiple existing monopolists, each 
exists by virtue of her political connection, could also enhance efficiency, as argued in Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993).
8  However, pervasive vertical integration aim to foreclose competition and to 
expand rent-seeking boundaries is by itself inefficiency, and might also signify greater returns to 
political rent-seeking, which is known to discourage economic activity and retard economic 
growth (Krueger, 1974; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991).   
  These considerations suggest that an economy should exhibit elevated per capita GDP 
and levels and growth rates if vertical integration is most pervasive among firms lacking 
political connections.  In contrast, economies in which vertical integration is most pervasive 
among firms with extensive political connections might well exhibit depressed per capita GDP 
levels and growth rates, though integration of vertically related monopolists might mitigate the 
effect.   
 
3.   Data, measurement, and basic statistics 
We examine the validity of the above hypotheses using China as our empirical setting.  Because 
of substantial variation in both the strength of market forces and the quality of institutions across 
its regions, China provides a natural testing ground for these issues.  This variation, against a less 
heterogeneous cultural background, provides a unique opportunity to examine the roles of 
market and legal institutions in firm vertical integration decisions.  Another advantage is that 
publicly available information lets us identify which Chinese firms receive preferential treatment 
                                                 
8 The argument is as follows: a unique highway that features only one toll booth will generate more efficient traffics 
than if the highway features multiple independent toll booths, assuming each toll booth owner aims to maximize her 
toll revenues.    16
or are ‘connected’ with government officials.  We note, however, this experiment is viable 
because Chinese markets are still very fragmented by provincial borders in the early 2000s, 
which is our data period.  This window of opportunity for research may disappear as China’s 
markets become more nationally integrated.     
The following first describes our sample and our measure of vertical integration, and then 
explores patterns of firm vertical integration.   
 
3.1.   Sample 
Our sample includes most companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 
2001 to 2003. The China Securities Regulatory Commission requires that listed companies 
disclose segment information for all business segments comprising more than 10% of 
consolidated sales, assets or profits.  Disclosed information about a given segment typically 
includes an industry name, a description of products or services, and segment sales, costs and 
profits. We manually collect these data from annual reports starting in 2001, since from that year 
on coverage and reporting quality are substantially improved.   
Companies reporting non-positive sales or incomplete segment sales and industry sector 
information are dropped.  Financial firms are excluded because their financial statements are not 
comparable to those of other firms.  Firms primarily in public utility sectors are excluded 
because their business decisions are strictly regulated.   
To be conservative, we include in our analyses only firms that have over our panel period 
stable scores on important firm level institutional characteristics, e.g., political connections and 
the choice of credible outside auditors.  In other words, we exclude firms that may exhibit 
changes in institutional characteristics and thus the level of integration and performance.     17
Including these observations, however, do not change our results qualitatively.  
Our final sample consists of 1,052 firms and 2,765 firm-year observations.  The sample 
firms account for almost eighty percent of listed companies.   
We define a firm’s primary industry as the industry in which it has the largest sales.  Our 
firms’ primary industries span the whole economy, with the most common being the machinery, 
equipment, and instrument sector, followed by the commerce (trade) sector, the petroleum and 
chemicals sector, and the glass, minerals and metals sector. Table 1 describes the sample by year 
and industry.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2.  Vertical integration measures 
We modify the methodology of Fan and Lang (2000) for measuring firm vertical integration.  
Given that direct firm-level data on vertical integration are unavailable, we use China’s input-
output matrix and our firm-level data on diversification across industries, described above, to 
construct a firm-level proxy for vertical integration intensity. The construction of this vertical 
integration measure involves two steps. 
In the first step, we create two matrices of inter-industry vertical relatedness coefficients.  
This involves computing the coefficients between each pair of 124 industries defined in the 1997 
Chinese input-output table. The table reports, for each pair of industries i and j, the value of 
inputs from industry i used by industry j as a fraction of the value of industry j’s total output.  
We denote this fraction vij.  Either a high vij or a high vji, or both, suggests opportunities to 
integrate activities in i and j to be integrated in the same firm.  We therefore define the vertical   18
relatedness coefficient between industries i and j either as  
 
[1]  ) ( 2
1
ji ij ij v v V + =   
 
or, alternatively, as  
 
[2] ) , max( ji ij ij v v V = . 
 
In the second step, we construct a firm-level vertical integration measure by computing 
the weighted average vertical relatedness coefficients of each pair of its segments, excluding 
same-segment pairs.  To do this, we construct a matrix of indicator variables [δi,j] for each firm, 
setting δi,j to one if the firm operates in both industries i and j, and to zero otherwise.  The firm’s 
vertical integration measure is then  
 
[3]  j i
n
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with Vi,j defined as in either [1] or [2] and with wi a weight equal to the sales of the firm’s 
segment in industry i. We divide the weighted sum in [3] by n - 1 to account for its mechanical 
increase with the number of segments the firm contains.
9   
We then define Vmean as the quantity defined by [3] using [1] to define Vi,j and Vmax as the 
                                                 
9 For example, consider a three-segment firm with one-third of its sales in each industry.  If the vertical relatedness 
coefficients for pairs of the segments were each one, the weighted sum of each pair of vertical coefficients is two.  
Dividing this sum by two (three minus one) rescales the vertical measure back to one. Unadjusted, the sum would 
rise with the number of segments.   19
analogous quantity using [2] to define Vi,j.  For a one-industry firm (n = 1), we set both Vmean and 
Vmax to zero. 
An example illustrates. Huangshan Tourism Development Co., Ltd has three segments: 
tour operation, hotels, and transportation, accounting for 51%, 24%, and 25% of firm sales, 
respectively. Using the input-output table, we estimate that tour operation employs ￥0.0700 of 
hotel services to produce one yuan of output, and conversely hotels consume ￥0.0020 of tour 
operation products for every yuan of output generated. The mean inter-industry relatedness 
coefficient of tour operation with hotels, Vij, is thus 0.0360, the average of the two input 
requirement ratios. Similarly, the mean coefficient of hotels with transportation is 0.0023, and 
that of tour operation with transportation is 0.0233. The equation above then lets us estimate the 
overall extent of vertical integration of the firm, with Vmean, defined as 1/2 × [51% × (0.0360 + 
0.0233) + 24% × (0.0023 + 0.0360) + 25% × (0.0233 + 0.0023)], or 0.0229. 
In other words, a firm’s level of vertical integration is the sales-weighted average of the 
vertical relatedness coefficients (based on economy averages) of all pairs of industries in which 
the firm reports sales.   
We calculate Vmean and Vmax for each firm each year. Table 2 summarizes these vertical 
integration measures. Panels A and B show the averages of Vmean and Vmax to be 0.014 and 0.025, 
respectively. That is, the firms potentially could transact 1.4 or 2.5 fen (the Chinese unit for 
“cent”), depending on which measure is used, of its business dealings with in-house affiliates, for 
every yuan of output it produces.  The average degree of vertical integration does not change 
significantly, in terms of either Vmean or Vmax, from 2001 to 2003. Across the 14 broad industries, 
vertical integration potential is most pronounced in mining; agriculture, forestry and fishing; 
textile, apparel and leather; and glass, minerals, and metals. Vertical integration potential is   20
lowest in real estate; medicine and biological products; and publishing, motion pictures and arts. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Ours is one of several possible methods for constructing a vertical integration index. One 
alternative would distinguish input integration from output integration.  Input integration, vij, 
measures the fraction of industry j’s input sourced from industry i; that is scaling the (i,j) entry in 
the I/O table by industry j’s total input. Output integration is then the fraction of output from 
industry i allocated to industry j; that is scaling the (i,j) entry in the I/O table by industry i’s total 
output.  One might legitimately define vertical relatedness in either way, or as the average, 
minimum, or maximum of the input and output measures, depending on the question at hand.  
All these alternatives generate results qualitatively similar, albeit statistically weaker, than those 
shown in the tables.   
For studies using Chinese input output data, the critical issue is noise due to end 
consumption and imports.  Large amount of end consumption and/or imports would induce noise 
in total output which is used as the scaling factor. Upon consulting experts on China’s official 
statistics, we elected to report the variables in the tables on the grounds that they are likely to be 
less contaminated by these problems. Our vertical integration indices thus reflect domestic 
industry sourcing from each other, scaled by domestic industry total output. 
 
3.3 Data  caveats 
Our data are observations of individual firms.  However, vertical integration can be 
accomplished by placing two or more seemingly distinct firms under common control – that is,   21
in a business group. Common control is most readily effected by combining two or more firms 
into one, but can also arise if a group of seemingly independent firms comes under the direct or 
indirect control of a single dominant shareholder (Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005).
10   We 
are not able to identify which, if any, of our firms belong to such business groups, and so might 
underestimate the overall incidence of vertical integration by omitting integration accomplished 
through business group formation or expansion.    
  If integration via business group is the norm, we should find no discernable relationship 
between individual firms’ vertical integration and our various other variables.  If integration 
occurs through both mechanisms, and if business groups simply add noise to our variables, any 
significant findings become all the more credible. 
Of course, if business group formation is governed by unknown factors that interact 
inauspiciously with our variables, clear econometric problems arise.  Dealing with these 
effectively would require the complete categorization of all group ties between all listed Chinese 
firms.  The construction of such a dataset lies well beyond the scope of this study; however, we 
hope to explore this issue in subsequent research. We return to the qualifications this imposes on 
our conclusions below.    
 
3.4.   Focal independent variables 
This section describes independent variables to proxy for possible economic determinants of 
vertical integration.  Some of these are available by industry or firm, but others are available by 
province.  We defined our sample of industries and firms above.  Before proceeding further, we 
must define what we mean by a “province”.   
                                                 
10 Other alternatives, such as cross-holdings, interlocking boards, director appointment clauses kin corporate 
charters, and the like are also possible.  See Khanna and Yafeh (2007).    22
  The People’s Republic of China is a federal state composed of twenty-two provinces 
(shěng, or 省 ), four province-level municipalities (zhíxiáshì, or 直辖市), two special 
administrative regions (tèbié xíngzhèngqū, or 特别行政区), and five autonomous regions 
(zīzhìqù, or 自治区).  Our list of provinces excludes Taiwan, which the People’s Republic 
considers a breakaway twenty-third province. The municipal governments of Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, and Chongqing exercise province-level powers.  The legislatures of the five 
autonomous regions – Tibet, Guangxi, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia – exercise slightly 
broader powers than those of the provinces, and each contain substantial non-Han populations. 
The governments of the two special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macau, exercise 
many of the powers of national governments, though not foreign affairs or defense.  However, 
their chief executives are directly appointed by Beijing.  The two special administrative regions 
are not included in our sample. 
For simplicity, we use the term province to refer to all of these regions, which the 
People’s Republic classifies as province-level or first-level administrative divisions.     
 
Asset specificity and uncertainty   
Vertical integration is a response to asset specificity and uncertainty associated with arm’s length 
transactions.  We capture asset specificity with a key institutional feature – the quality of each 
province’s  transportation infrastructure, as reflected in the total length, in kilometres, of 
railways, waterways, and highways in the province divided by its total geographic area, in square 
kilometres.  Inadequate regional transportation infrastructure restricts parties’ ability to find 
alternative business partners, and so heightens asset specificity problems by aggravating the 
potential for hold-up problems.  This elevates the costs of market transactions, rendering vertical   23
integration more desirable.      
We gauge performance uncertainty by input price uncertainty, as in Lieberman (1991) 
and Fan (2000).  We define price uncertainly as the standard error of the residuals of a regression 
of the log of an industry’s annual inflation-adjusted primary input price index on a time trend 
from 1990 to 2001.  Higher price uncertainty should raise arm’s-length transactions costs and 
therefore render vertical integration more likely.  All else equal, this effect should be more 
pronounced in industries where asset specificity hold-up problems are also more severe.  That is, 
higher price uncertainty and worse transportation infrastructure together should induce even 
more extensive vertical integration. 
 
Institutional factors   
Section 2 hypothesizes that vertical integration should correlate with various institutional 
deficiencies, such as weak legal institutions, low quality government, and lagging market 
development.   
We measure legal development using an index, developed by Fan and Wang (2001, 2002, 
2003), that reflects the frequency of lawsuits and the efficiency of courts in each province.  The 
frequency of lawsuits is defined as the number of business or economic lawsuits, most of which 
involve contract enforcement or other property rights issues, scaled by the province’s GDP in 
constant yuan.  Ordinarily, the frequency of lawsuits need not have a monotonic relationship 
with legal development in property rights protection.  Lawsuits can be frivolous and excessive. 
Or, contracts can be so well honored that lawsuits are rare.  In the Chinese context, neither 
nonmonotonicity is plausible.  The use of the judicial system to enforce contractual and property 
rights is only beginning to seem practicable, and to different degrees across provinces.   Court   24
efficiency is defined as the number of economic or business lawsuits concluded by the court in a 
year divided by number of cases filed that year.
11  We follow Fan and Wang (2001) in using the 
first principal component of these two indexes as our proxy for the strength of legal protection 
accorded private property rights in each province.
12 
Our measure of local government development is based on a set of government services 
quality indicators published by The Annual Report of Urban Competitiveness in China.
13   
Researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Science survey a sample of ordinary citizens, 
entrepreneurs, and scholars in multiple cities.  The survey contains 116 questions to gauge the 
“competitiveness of cities” in China.  The questions related to government service quality 
measure (i) satisfaction with the city’s government; (ii) the frequency of infringements of 
property rights by the city government in land redeployment and resident relocation; and (iii) the 
extent to which the city government imposes bureaucratic burdens such as delays, derelictions of 
official duties, and red-tape.  Respondents answer each with a rating ranging from 1 (bad) to 7 
(good). Using these survey data, the authors employ a principal component analysis to construct 
an overall index of government service quality at the city level.  We aggregate the city level 
index to the province level by taking its average across all cities in each province.   
Finally, we gauge market development in each province using the percentage of workers 
in the province officially registered as employed in the private sector – that is, as employed in 
private enterprises or self-employed individual (gètíhù or 个体户) – rather than as employees of 
                                                 
11 Specifically, the “frequency of lawsuits” index level is defined as (Smax – Si)/(Smax – Smin) ×10, where Si is the 
number of lawsuits divided by provincial GDP and Smin and Smax are, respectively, the minimum and maximum Si 
among the 31 provinces and special districts in China. The “court efficiency” of region i is  (Ci – Cmin)/(Cmax – Cmin) 
× 10, where Ci is the number of economic or business lawsuits concluded by the court in a year divided by number 
of cases filed in the year; and with Cmin and Cmax the minimum and maximum, respectively, of Ci across Chinese 
provinces and special districts.   
12 The weight of “frequency of lawsuits” is 0.545 and that of “court efficiency” is 0.455.   
13 This report is published by Social Science Academic Press in 2004.   25
state owned enterprises or state and Party organs (China Statistical Almanac).  Ideally, we would 
prefer a general measure capturing the extent to which intermediate goods are allocated by 
markets rather than bureaucrats. Such measures are not readily available. We instead examine 
the extent to which the employment of labor, a key input of most business activities, is made in 
the private sector rather than through the state system.  We expect that a high degree of private 
sector employment is associated with a vibrant general market activity. 
   
Rent-seeking potential and political connections  
Section 2 also points out that vertical integration might be motivated by rent-seeking.  We 
therefore construct a set of political connection variables to capture firms’ potential returns to 
political rent-seeking.  
Following Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007), our first political connections variable is 
apparatchik CEO, an indicator variable set to one if a firm’s CEO is, or has been, a state or 
Communist Party official of the central government, the regional government, or an industry 
bureau.     
Our second measure, business privilege, also an indicator variable, is set to one if any of 
the firm’s lines of business is a heavily regulated sector (electricity, communication, 
transportation, mining, metal, or petroleum industry) and to zero otherwise.  In China, the right 
to operate in these sectors is highly restricted, and must be granted by the State.  
We surmise that corporate insiders with Party or government backgrounds, or who 
obtained the right to operate in a heavily regulated industry, are likely to be politically 
connected.  We therefore take these two variables as reflecting political rent-seeking ability. We 
assume such ability opens further political rent-seeking opportunities, and hence provides   26
superior access to business opportunities.  
Our third measure of politically connections is long-term high leverage, measured by 
each firm’s long-term debt over its total assets. Sapienza (2004) and Khawaja and Mian (2005), 
Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) argue that politically connected firms have better access to bank 
financing in general. Because China’s banks are all state-controlled, this bias is quite likely even 
stronger there. We therefore set the indicator variable high leverage to one if a firm’s long-term 
debt over total assets is above the median for all firms in that province, and to zero otherwise.  A 
caveat is in order here, however, for this variable has a potential alternative interpretation – 
better access to capital facilitates acquisitions, including acquisitions of vertically related firms. 
 
Accountability 
The relationship of vertical integration to firm value is affected by the extents to which public 
shareholders can monitor insiders and sustain incentives to align insiders’ interests with public 
shareholder value.  To capture monitoring and incentive alignment, we use an indicator variable 
denoted auditor, set to one if the firm’s external auditor is one of the international “Big Four”, 
and to zero otherwise.  Evidence from the accounting literature suggests that emerging market 
firms with “Big Four” auditors are more transparent to investors and have lower costs of capital 
than firms with other auditors (see e.g., Titman and Truman, 1986).  In China, many auditors are 
small businesses, and may not even have professional accreditation.  In contrast, the “Big Four” 
are large independent auditors with strong international reputations and experience with more 
demanding and rigorous foreign auditing standards.  We expect that insiders scrutinized by “Big 
Four” auditors are less likely to appropriate wealth from their firms, including wealth 
accumulated via political rent seeking.  Another caveat is in order, for this variable might also   27
reflect self-selection, rather than auditing effectiveness.  
 
Other controls 
We consider several more variables as controls.  First, larger firms might be more vertically 
integrated than smaller ones simply because they are larger.  For example, economies of scale in 
a core line of business might translate into similar economies in secondary and tertiary lines of 
business, rendering vertical integration less costly.  We gauge firm size by the natural log of the 
firm’s total assets.   
  Firms can diversify horizontally, into unrelated lines of business, as well as vertically.  
Horizontal diversification cannot be motivated by the need to evade dysfunctional markets, since 
operations that are not vertically linked, by definition, do not do business with each other.   
However, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find unrelated diversification events to reduce 
firm values, and present evidence linking that strategy to aggravated agency problems associated 
with empire-building CEOs. If such agency problems also motivate vertical integration, our 
vertical integration measures may capture this effect.  We therefore construct a diversification 
control – the number of industry segments the firm possesses.   We are interested in agency 
driven vertical integration, so controlling for horizontal diversification may cut into effects we 
wish to detect.  However, we wish to distinguish effects associated with vertical integration for 
those associated with diversification in general.   
Young firms might be more vertically integrated than old firms because it takes time to 
establish exchange relationships in China’s emerging marketplace.  Or young firms might be 
more vertically integrated if formerly fully state-owned enterprises are highly vertically 
integrated at their IPOs, and acquire more focus subsequently.  To control for either eventuality,   28
we measure firm age by the number of years the firm has been listed, and denote this years 
listed.      
We also include provincial per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to account for the 
effects of regional economic conditions on firm organizational structure.  This control also 
mitigates the possibility that our transportation infrastructure and institutional variables might 
proxy for general province-level development.  
Table 3 summarizes the definitions and data sources for these variables.  
 
[Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
3.5   Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 reports basic descriptive statistics across pooled observations for each variable. The 
number of observations differs across variables because some are province-level while others are 
industry- or firm-level. The government development variable has fewer observations than other 
province-level variables because it is available only for 2003.  Substantial variation in 
institutional quality across China’s regions is confirmed by the substantial standard deviations of 
the province-level institutional variables.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 displays Pearson correlation coefficients. Since much of our data are highly 
persistent panel observations, we first take time-series averages of all variables, and then 
estimate simple correlation coefficients using the resulting single cross section.  Since many of   29
our observations are replicated across all firms in a province or industry, these replicated 
observations are obviously not independent, and are rescaled accordingly.  Specifically, the t-
statistics of the correlations involving province-level variables are overstated by  31 / 052 , 1 , the 
square root of the number of firms over the number of provinces.  We therefore divide the t-
ratios of correlations of province level variables with each other or with firm-level variables by 
this factor. Since we have firms in 81 distinct industries, a similar adjustment divides the t-
statistics correlation involving industry-level variables by 81 / 052 , 1 .  The t-statistics of the 
correlations between industries and provinces are scaled by   584 / 052 , 1    to reflect the 584 
distinct province-industry pairs in which we observe firms.  This approach is conservative, in 
that it understates the significance of correlations involving variables with meaningful time-
series variation, but avoids overstating the significance of those with substantial persistence 
through time.   
Vertical integration correlates positively with price uncertainty, and negatively with 
transportation infrastructure. Both vertical integration measures also correlate negatively with 
institutional strength, as measured by our province-level property rights, government, and market 
development indexes, though these correlations fall short of significance. This may be due to the 
conservative estimation approach that we employ. Vertical integration significantly correlates 
positively with all the three measures of political connections.  These findings leave scope for all 
the drivers of vertical integration considered above.    
Finally, the table warns of potential multicollinearity between the transportation 
infrastructure variable and government development (ρ = 0.469), market development (ρ = 
0.435) and also the provincial level GDP per capita (ρ = 0.838).  Likewise, per capita GDP also 
correlates significantly positively with government development, and market development. We   30
revisit these correlations below when we discuss our multiple regressions.   
 
4. Vertical  integration and its determinants 
We now turn to multiple regressions that control for other factors that might affect vertical 
integration.  We run these on pooled firm-year data. Our province level variables exhibit no 
variation across firms within each province, and several firm variables have only small variations 
over time.  Likewise, we have industry-level variables that exhibit little or no variation across 
firms in each industry.  Finally, some of our firm level variables may well exhibit little or no 
variation through time.  To avoid upward biased t-statistics, we employ Huber-White standard 
errors clustered by industry, province and year throughout, as recommended by Petersen (2005), 
Donald and Lang (2007), and Green (2007).    
The values of our vertical integration measures, Vmean or Vmax, are bounded below by 
spikes of observations at zero – presumably because some firms decide the net costs of operating 
in multiple industries along the value chain outweigh the net benefits of specialization. To 
resolve this data censor problem, we employ Tobit regression. Table 6 reports regressions 
explaining Vmean. Regressions explaining Vmax (not shown) generate qualitatively similar results, 
by which we mean identical signs, patterns of statistical significance, and rough coefficient 
magnitudes.   
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
The first column in Table 6, denoted regression 6.1, reveals price uncertainty 
significantly positively correlated with vertical integration intensity. The positive coefficient of   31
transportation infrastructure is due to multicollinearity caused by the interaction item. When we 
construct a new price uncertainty variable by deducting its mean value and re-run the regression, 
the coefficient of transportation infrastructure becomes no longer significant. Further, the 
coefficient of interaction item between price uncertainty and transportation infrastructure is 
significantly negative, suggesting that a weak transportation system in the presence of high price 
uncertainty also correlates significantly with greater vertical integration. The other specifications 
in Table 6 include additional variables, yet these results stand unscathed.  We interpret this 
pattern as consistent with greater vertical integration occurring where asset specificity problems 
and uncertainty pose greater threats to overly specialized firms.   
The second pattern is evident in regressions 6.2 through 6.5, which all show more 
extensive vertical integration in provinces with worse legal protection for private property rights 
worse government, and less developed market economies.  These institutional variables are 
clearly economically significant too.  For example, based on regression 6.2, setting all the 
independent variables at their means, a ten percent improvement in the property rights reduces 
vertical integration (Vmean) by 10.5 percent, almost 4.23 times larger than the standard deviation 
of the vertical integration measure. The remaining independent variables exhibit the same pattern 
as before.  Similarly, a 10% improvement in “government quality” reduces vertical integration 
(Vmean) by 36.5 %, almost 14.7 times as large as the standard deviation of the vertical integration 
measure.  Market development is a little less economically significant, a 10% improvement 
reduces vertical integration by 5.87%.   
We take this pattern as consistent with a transactions costs explanation of vertical 
integration: it lets firms circumvent weak institutions that render private transactions 
problematic.   32
The third pattern evident in Table 6 pertains to our measures of political connections.  
Because Table 5 shows the three proxies for “connections” significantly correlated with each 
other, Table 6 presents separate regressions – 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 – including each political 
connections proxy in turn, rather than a single regression including all three. The political 
connection variables, apparatchik CEO and business privilege, are both significantly positively 
correlated with vertical integration. The sign of high leverage is positive but its 10.8% p-level is 
almost close to statistical significance. The coefficients of the other independent variables remain 
qualitatively unchanged.  Political connections have very high economic impact.  Switching a 
firm’s CEO from not being a prior government bureaucrat to being one increases vertical 
integration by 166%.  Switching a firm from operating in only unregulated industries to 
operating in regulated industries increases vertical integration by 85.2%.   
We interpret these results as consistent with politically connected firms being more 
vertically integrated.  
All the specifications in Table 6 control for the per capita GDP of the province in which 
the firm is based.  This control is insignificant except in regression 6.3, again consistent with the 
importance of specific dimensions of development – better legal protection of private property 
rights, more responsible government, and more mature market economies – rather than generally 
higher living standards. This makes intuitive sense since these particular institutions are critical 
in enabling market transactions in intermediate goods, while generally high incomes are at mot 
only indirectly related to the functioning of these markets. 
The coefficients of diversification are significantly positive across all specifications, 
indicating that diversified firms are more vertically integrated. All the specifications also control 
for age as a listed firm, which attracts significant negative coefficients throughout.  Firms that   33
listed earlier tend to be less vertically integrated, echoing the simple correlations in Table 5.  
Since Table 2 shows no obvious time trend in vertical integration, it would appear that seasoned 
listed firms grow more specialized towards the end of our sample period, as additional relatively 
integrated state-controlled enterprises list.  
As robustness checks, we apply an inverse logistic transformation to our vertical 
integration measures, mapping Vmean into Vmean′ = ln[1/(1 – Vmean)]. We then regress the 
transformed measures on the variables in the Table, using either a tobit or least squares 
regression, again with standard errors clustered by industry, province and year, and again 
generate similar results to those shown.   
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 reports a maximally conservative approach – collapsing our 2001 to 2003 panel 
of data into a single cross-section of time-series averages, and then running regressions 
analogous to those in Table 6 on this cross-section, with standard errors clustered by industry and 
province. This also generates qualitatively similar results but the “business privilege” variable 
becomes insignificant. Further, we now find that transportation infrastructure is insignificant in 
the mean regression. 
The input-output statistics of the “wholesale” and “retail” sectors are aggregated and 
labelled “commerce” in Table 2.  These input and output flows may be excessively aggregated, 
and thus qualitatively different from other sectors (Fan and Lang, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Mitton, 2005). As a check of robustness, we therefore repeat our regressions excluding these 
sectors. This cuts our panel by about 400 firm-year observations, yet again yields qualitatively   34
similar results to those shown.  
Overall, we take Tables 6 and 7 as consistent with vertical integration being linked to 
asset specificity and price uncertainty, and with these factors encouraging vertical integration as 
an organizational response to weak property rights protection, poor quality government, and ill-
developed market economies.  These results are also consistent with a link between vertical 
integration and political rent-seeking.   
 
5.  Vertical integration, transparency, and firm value 
This section explores links between vertical integration and firm performance.  We gauge each 
firm’s performance as the valuation given it by public shareholders.  We gauge shareholder 
valuation by market-to-book ratios, rough proxies for Tobin’s average q.  Specifically, we define 
a firm’s market-to-book ratio as the sum of the market value of its tradable equity, the book 
value of its untradable equity, and the book value of its debt, all divided by its total assets. The 
value of tradable shares is estimated as the fiscal year-end closing price per share times the 
number of tradable shares.  
Valuing nontradable shares, a substantial part of the equity of a typical Chinese listed 
firm, is problematic.  These classes of shares are held by various state or Party organs, and 
usually sum to overwhelmingly dominant state control blocks.  This suggests a possible control 
premium, as in Dyck and Zingales (2004), and that we might value nontradable shares at the 
price of tradable shares plus that premium.  However, in 2007, nontradable shares were 
converted en masse to tradable shares, and the overall price per share of the typical Chinese firm 
fell sharply, suggesting that nontradable shares were worth less than tradable shares.  Apparently, 
many firms were excused from paying dividends on large blocks of nontradable shares, and lost   35
this privilege when their common equity was unified (Li et al., 2008).  Given this ambiguity, we 
value untradable shares at book, and then conduct a range of robustness tests using alternative 
valuations – valuing them at zero, and also at the same price as the firm’s tradable shares.   
Shareholder value is a useful performance barometer, in that it aggregates the opinions of 
all active investors (Grossman, 1976) and is a future oriented measure of expected performance 
(Gordon, 1962).  However, shareholder valuations can deviate from more basic measures of firm 
performance, such as total factor productivity growth, job creation, or average wage paid, 
depending on how the firm’s economic profits are distributed across investors and various 
stakeholders, including workers, politicians, and others.  For example, if top managers 
appropriate extensive private benefits, deflect profits to political patrons, or use corporate 
resources for personal or political agendas, a well-performing firm might look ill to shareholders 
and workers alike.
14   At present, we lack the data needed to pursue these more nuanced 
alternative measures of performance.   
  Since this shortcoming in our performance measure is unavoidable, we make a virtue of 
necessity and exploit the imperfection to gain a deeper understanding of our findings.  We do 
this by distinguishing firms with “Big Four” auditors from other firms.  A “Big Four” auditor 
plausibly provides an enhanced transparency that permits public shareholder a greater share of 
any value created by vertical integration.  Firms that rely on local auditors are plausibly 
relatively opaque, perhaps letting their insiders appropriate for themselves or their associates any 
additional value vertical integration might yield.     
To capture accountability to public shareholders, we construct an auditor indicator 
variable, set to one if the firm has a “Big Four” auditor and to zero otherwise.  
                                                 
14 A well-performing firm might also seem infirm to its investors if its top managers treat its employees with 
extreme generosity – whether out of genuine solidarity or, more plausibly in modern China, political career 
calculation. We hope to pursue this in subsequent research.      36
Our market-to-book ratios regressions thus include Vmean, our audit indicator variable, 
and a set of control variables.  The last set includes diversification, size, leverage, sales growth, 
state ownership, and years listed.
15 Diversification, firm size, and years listed are all as defined 
above. Diversified firms are known to trade at a discount elsewhere (Lang and Stulz, 1994), and 
at least part of this discount is clearly caused by diversifying mergers (Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1990). We include firm size because larger firms and smaller firms may be attractive to 
different classes of investors, who assign them different valuations.  We further control for years 
listed, since valuations of newly listed firms differ systematically from those of other firms 
(Ritter, 1991).    
We measure leverage as total liabilities divided by total assets, and include this because it 
reflects possible tax effects that distort firm valuations.
16 However, leverage may have a negative 
effect if investors discount the values of firms with nontrivial debt default risks.  State ownership 
is the percentage of tradable plus nontradable shares owned by governments directly, or voted 
via state or Party organs if those are the largest shareholders.  We include this because greater 
state influence can presumably bend corporate strategies to political ends, and thereby erode 
shareholder valuations.
17   
We need to adjust for possible endogeneity in the vertical integration and auditor 
variables, since each firm’s top insiders can decide on the firm’s level of integration and whether 
or not to hire a “Big Four” auditor.  These decisions could well reflect a range of background 
                                                 
15 Our political connections variable, high leverage, is long-term debt over assets being higher than the provincial 
median.  The correlation between this and leverage is 0.0486 (p = 0.12), so the two variables are capturing distinct 
effect.  Using Vmax as the independent variable generates results qualitatively similar to those in the table.  Again, we 
do not report the results to save space. 
16  Interest expenses are tax deductible at the corporate level.  Dividends are subject to double taxation, taxable at 
both the corporate and the personal levels. 
17 This is because state ownership can imply pressure to optimize social objectives, rather than economic efficiency; 
and also because state ownership can be indicative of importance in the political arena, which can affect operating 
efficiency, bargaining power, and other related matters, and thus firm performance.   37
factors that might also affect valuation.  We therefore employ a Heckman two-stage correction.   
We first estimate a probit regression of an indicator variable for vertical integration on 
the set of explanatory variables discussed above: uncertainty, asset specificity, institution, 
political connection and the other control variables.   Here, the vertical integration indicator 
variable equals one if Vmean ≥ 0.01, and zero otherwise.
18 We then include the resulting inverse 
Mills ratios as an additional explanatory variable, alongside vertical integration, in our 
regressions of market-to-book ratios.  This procedure, in theory, provides a clearer estimate of 
the effect of vertical integration on shareholder valuation. The first stage regression is presented 
in Panel A of Table 8. 
19     
Our analogous endogeneity adjustment for auditor choice is derived from a probit 
regression of our “Big Four” auditor indicator variable on a set of explanatory variables shown 
important to auditor choice in the accounting literature – firm size, asset structure (current assets 
over current liabilities), accounts receivable over assets, and inventory over assets (Chaney, Jeter 
and Shivakumar, 2004).
 20   Panel B of Table 8 displays this regression, whose estimated 
coefficients we use to calculate a second inverse Mills ratio for inclusion alongside our auditor 
indicator variable in the second stage regressions explaining shareholder valuations.  As a 
robustness test, we include only firm size and asset structure in the first-stage regression, and 
obtain similar results. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
                                                 
18 The 0.01 cutoff has been demonstrated as a natural break point that can be used for classifying vertical integration 
(Fan and Lang, 2000). Using alternative cutoffs such as 0.02 would not qualitatively change our results. 
19 The table, uses apparatchik CEO to gauge political connections. Results using our other political connection 
variables, business privilege and high leverage, are quite similar.  
20 As a robustness test, we include only firm size and asset structure in the first-stage regression, and obtain similar 
results.   38
 
Panel C of Table 8 displays our second stage regressions and p-levels, again with 
industry, province and year clustering, as recommended by Petersen (2005), Donald and Lang 
(2007), and Green (2007).  Several key patterns emerge.     
Regression 8C.1 reveals vertical integration entirely unrelated to shareholder valuations, 
though several control variables are significant.  Specifically, state ownership and size attract 
significant negative coefficients; while leverage and years listed take positive significant 
coefficients. 
Having a “Big Four” auditor is strongly significantly linked to higher firm valuations.  
This is consistent with credible firms self-selecting to be audited by reputable auditors, and with 
auditors’ reputations lending credibility to firms.   
To see if insiders’ scope for political rent-seeking correlates with shareholder valuations, 
we again include each of our three measures of political connections, in turn, in regressions 8C.2 
though 8C.4.   The result shows that having a politically connected CEO does appear to translate 
into higher market valuations of a firm’s shares, and operating in a government restricted 
industry does correlate with higher valuations, while enjoying access to loans from state banks 
correlates with depressed shareholder valuations.  The last may indicate that connected firms can 
better tap debt should they fall into financial difficulties; but might also indicate that these firms 
have politicized objective functions that deviate from value maximization.    
The most interesting coefficients in the table are of the cross terms.  Regressions 8C.2 
through 8C.4 reveal significantly interaction effects – Vmean gains a negative significant 
coefficient if the firm is politically connected, regardless of which measure of political 
connections we use. These results – depressed shareholder valuations of firms conducting   39
vertical integration and political rent seeking – at first glance seem incongruous, for vertical 
integration and rent seeking should be mutually reinforcing competitive advantages in China’s 
weak institutional environments. However, the incongruity is resolved if corporate, political, or 
other insiders reap most of the benefits ensuing from rent-seeking and vertical integration, and 
leave little for public shareholders.   
This interpretation is buttressed by additional interactions with the auditor variable.   
Although the interaction of auditor and Vmean is insignificant, indicating that a “Big Four” auditor 
adds little to the average vertically integrated firm, a triple interaction term suggests a subtler 
effect. If vertical integration and rent-seeking reinforce each other in weak institutional 
environments, a “Big Four” auditor might be most useful to public shareholders in firms 
benefiting from that reinforcement.  We therefore include a three-way interaction term between 
Vmean, our “Big Four” auditor indicator, and each of the political connections variables in turn. 
These triple interactions attract uniformly positive coefficients, and those gauging 
political connections by the right to operate in regulated sectors or by access to loans are 
uniformly significant. This is consistent with rent-seeking related vertical integration augmenting 
firm market valuations only if the firm’s insiders subject themselves to credible external 
monitoring.  Presumably, such monitoring commits insiders to share the benefits of vertical 
integration and rent-seeking with public shareholders.  
As a robustness check, we substitute Vmax for Vmean, repeat the Table 8 regressions, and 
obtain qualitatively similar results to those shown.  As another robustness check, we drop the 
diversification variable from the right-hand side to avoid multicollinearity.  Again, qualitatively 
identical results ensue.  We also run the regression on the cross- section of time-serial means of 
all variables. These results too are qualitatively similar.   40
Both vertical integration and valuation might be driven by latent institutional factors, 
rendering the statistical relation between them spurious. To partially address this, we repeat the 
valuation regressions including as additional controls our full set of institutional variables and 
their interaction terms with the political connections and auditor choice variables. This too leaves 
the results above qualitatively unchanged.  
 
6.   Vertical integration and provincial economy performance 
Regardless of its firm-level impact, vertical integration motivated by different factors could have 
decidedly different effects on an economy.  Vertical integration as a second best response to 
arm’s length transaction difficulties amid a weak legal system and weak market forces should 
enhance efficiency and thus contribute to an economy’s per capita GDP level and growth rate.  
In contrast, vertical integration undertaken to magnify the returns to political rent-seeking should 
inhibit the efficient allocation of resources and thus depress the economy’s per capita GDP level 
and growth rate.  As a first pass investigation of this issue, we turn to a set of province level 
regressions.  A more detailed investigation is relegated to future research.  
We first classify each firm as either politically connected or not according to each of our 
three political connections indicator variables – having an apparatchik as a CEO, operating in a 
restricted industry, and obtaining higher than median leverage from state banks.  Next we 
calculate the average value of our vertical integration measure across all politically connected 
firms in each province.  This yields three measures of the intensity of vertical integration among 
politically connected firms in each province, one for each of our political connections variables. 
We then repeat this procedure for politically unconnected firms, and obtain three analogous 
measures of the intensity of vertical integration among politically unconnected firms in each   41
province, one for each of our political connections variables.   We do this for all 31 provinces 
each year.
21  
Because these vertical integration intensity measures vary little across time, we condense 
them, and all our other province-level panel data, by taking time means of all variables. This 
yields a single province-level cross section with 31 observations. This repeats the 
econometrically conservative approach of Table 7, in that this biases our subsequent analysis 
against finding significant results if any tractable time series variation is present.   
Our left-hand side variable measures economy performance as either per capita GDP 
level – defined as a the province’s mean provincial per capita GDP across 2001, 2002, and 2003 
or per capita GDP growth – defined as the log of per capita GDP in 2003 minus the same in 
2001.   We regress these on the integration intensity of the province’s politically connected and 
unconnected firms and on our institutional variables – legal development,  government 
development, and market development.   
We supplement these with a few other controls.  Physical and human capital are known to 
be a first-order determinants of economic growth (see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). We 
measure a province’s physical capital, denoted as capital. To estimate capital, we use a perpetual 
inventory model that sums the annual provincial capital investment from 1984 to 2000 with a 
depreciation rate of 7%. Human capital is measured as the fraction of each province’s population 
classified by the National Bureau of Statistics of China as “literate” in 2001, which  is denoted 
education.  Standard growth theory also implies a convergence effect:  economies with lower 
initial levels of per capita GDP can grow faster than those already sustaining high incomes 
                                                 
21 No firms based in Inner Mongolia or Tibet have apparatchiks as CEOs, so we cannot construct a measure of the 
degree of vertical integration among connected firms using this definition of “politically connected”. Likewise, no 
firms based in Guangxi operate in restricted industries.  We therefore substitute interprovincial means for these 
missing values.     42
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).  We therefore include the logarithm of 2001 per capita GDP as 
a control variable in our growth regressions.  
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
Table 9 displays the results. The coefficient estimates are not uniformly significant, but 
the incidence of vertical integration among politically unconnected firms attracts positive 
coefficients whenever it is significant, and the incidence of vertical integration among politically 
connected firms attracts negative coefficients wherever it is significant.  
These results are strongest if we mark political connection by the firm having an 
apparatchik CEO –– perhaps because this is our most direct measure of political connections.  
Provinces grow significantly slower if their apparatchik-run firms tend to be vertically 
integrated; and significantly faster if their apparatchik-free firms tend to be vertically integrated.    
These results are economically significant too. Consider the GDP growth regression 
using an apparatchik CEO to gauge political connections.  All else equal, a province whose 
apparatchik-run firms have a mean vertical integration intensity one-standard deviation higher 
lags an otherwise similar province’s three-year per capita GDP growth rate by 1.33 percentage 
points. Similarly, a province whose apparatchik-free firms have a mean vertical integration 
intensity one-standard deviation greater reaps 2.40 extra percentage points of additional per 
capita GDP growth over three years  The mean three-year growth rate across provinces is 22.9%, 
so other factors clearly dominate, but few Chinese would spurn an extra few percentage point of 
economic growth each year.  The effect is clearly large enough to matter, and the sum of the two 
differences, 3.73 percentage points is almost one fifth of the mean.       43
These results are robust. We use medians to generate our vertical integration intensity 
measures.  Employing asset-weighted means generates qualitatively similar results. We 
substitute interprovincial medians for missing values and get qualitatively similar results.   
Dropping observations with missing values also leaves our findings qualitatively unchanged. 
We interpret these findings as broadly consistent with vertical integration among 
politically unconnected firms being associated with superior provincial economic performance; 
and with vertical integration among politically connected firms being associated with retarded 
provincial economic performance.   
 
7.   Conclusions  
Patterns of vertical integration in China correspond well to likely regional transactions cost 
differences.  Firms are more vertically integrated in provinces with weaker property rights 
protection, worse government, and laggard market reforms.  These observations are consistent 
with vertical integration being used to overcome transaction difficulties where property rights 
protection and market disciplinary forces are weak.  They are also consistent with vertical 
integration being used to overcome impediments to doing business posed by overly bureaucratic 
governments that are disinclined to respect private property rights.  These results persist after 
controlling for the effects of industry factors, local transportation infrastructure, input price 
uncertainty, firms size, overall diversification, age as a listed firm, and regional economic 
development.   
Firms whose managers have closer ties to bureaucrats are also more vertically integrated.  
Provinces where market institutions are weak are likely also places where political rent-seeking 
pays a high return.  If political rent-seeking helps firms gain state enforced monopoly power,   44
rent-seekers should direct their lobbying towards gaining vertically integrated monopolies.  This 
is because a vertically integrated monopoly can extract unambiguously higher profits than a 
string of vertically related single-market monopolies (Spengler, 1950).  This suggests a less 
laudable use of vertical integration to magnify the returns to political rent seeking by foreclosing 
competition along broader swathes of a value chain.   
Our evidence of the link between vertical integration and firm market valuations is 
mixed, but in a way that underscores both explanations. Vertical integration by politically 
connected firms is negatively related to firm value absent a “Big Four” auditor, but the relation 
becomes positive if one is present.  These results are consistent with any net benefits of vertical 
integration accruing to the firm’s insiders absent a credible external monitor, but being shared 
with public shareholders in the presence of such a monitor.    
Our evidence of the economy wide effects of vertical integration is more straightforward, 
if statistically less impressive.  Extensive vertical integration among politically connected firms 
is associated with laggard per capita GDP levels and growth rates, while extensive vertical 
integration among other firms is associated with elevated GDP levels and growth rates.  .   
These empirical results, taken as a whole, support a transactions costs explanation of 
vertical integration. But they also point to a parallel political economy explanation of vertical 
integration.  Our finding of lagging provincial economy performance where vertically integrated 
firms are politically connected suggests this alternative possibility at least be taken seriously.   
Further work is needed to test this possibility more thoroughly and discount alternative 
explanations of our findings, and numerous caveats apply.  Certainly, China’s experience may, 
but need not, extend to other economies. Nonetheless, the evidence here provides a benchmark 
for comparison with other emerging and transition economies with similar institutional asthenia.   45
In China, successive reforms are progressively separating business from government, but 
at markedly different paces in different provinces.  Where that separation is least advanced, state 
and Party officials are also freest to prey upon private businesses.  Perhaps the only viable 
businesses in such regions are those run by the potential predators, either de jure via direct state 
control or de facto via their cronies.  
Since the most politically connected may not be the most creative entrepreneurs, growth 
in these regions may well be triply impeded – by weak institutions forcing greater vertical 
integration; by entrusting corporate decision-making to the politically connected, rather than the 
most able entrepreneurs; and by large vertically integrated monopolies capable of inflicting 
worse overall welfare losses than separate single-market monopolies could manage.   
The potential costs of such a threefold self-reinforcing drag on economic growth should 
be of concern to Chinese policy-makers because increasing interregional inequality is a 
potentially serious source of political instability.  Our findings regarding ‘Big Four’ auditors 
suggest an escape if policy makers desire one:  increased transparency can interrupt this cycle by 
limiting political insiders’ wealth extraction. Limiting the personal benefits politically connected 
insiders can reap should render the construction of vertically integrated monopolies less 
attractive to them, and thus diffuse the pressure they can exert on state and party officials, 
opening the way to faster reforms and institutional development.        
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Table 1.  Sample, by Year and Industry 
Our sample consists of non-financial, non-public utility listed companies in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2003. All such firms are included except companies 
reporting non-positive sales or incomplete segment sales and industry sector information.  
Industry  2001 2002 2003 Total 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  15  12  11  38 
Mining  9  11 13 33 
Food and Beverages  51  56  54  161 
Textile, Apparel and Leather  39  42  37  118 
Lumber, Furniture, Paper and Printing  23  28  29  80 
Petroleum, Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products  111  109  118  338 
Glass, Minerals and Metals  96  109  123  328 
Machinery, Equipment and Instrument  210  233  242  685 
Medicine and Biological Products  49  56  67  172 
Construction  15 19 20 54 
Commerce  130 136 150 416 
Real  Estate  48 62 70  180 
Services  50 53 51  154 
Publishing, Motion Pictures and Arts  2  3  3  8 
Total - All industries  848  929  988  2,765 
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Table 2.  Patterns of Vertical Integration 
Summary statistics by year and industry for firm-level vertical integration measures Vmean and Vmax. 
Firms are more vertically integrated if their segments lie in industries that source or sell more 
extensively to each other in China’s national input-output table. Vmean is based on the average and 
Vmax on the maximum of sourcing and selling for each pair of industries. 
 
Panel A:  Vertical integration intensity, Vmean, by Year  
Year Obs. Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Min. Max. 
2001    848  0.0141  0.00862  0.0242  0.000  0.267 
2002    929  0.0138  0.00734  0.0254  0.000  0.267 
2003    988  0.0141  0.00781  0.0248  0.000  0.267 
Total  2,765  0.0140 0.00783 0.0248  0.000  0.267 
 
Panel B: Vertical integration intensity, Vmax, by Year  
Year Obs. Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Min. Max. 
2001    848  0.0246  0.0131  0.0461  0.000  0.530 
2002    929  0.0242  0.0123  0.0486  0.000  0.530 
2003    988  0.0249  0.0127  0.0474  0.000  0.530 
Total  2,765  0.0246 0.0127 0.0474  0.000  0.530 
 
Panel C: Vertical Integration Intensity by Industry 
Vmean  Vmax  Industry Obs. 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing    38  0.0285 0.00691 0.0561  0.0114 
Mining    33 0.0432 0.0146 0.0699 0.0265 
Food and Beverages  161  0.0145  0.00626  0.0281  0.0116 
Textile, Apparel and Leather  118  0.0182  0.00584  0.0313  0.00777 
Lumber, Furniture, Paper and Printing    80 0.00925  0.00459 0.0169 0.00823 
Petroleum, Chem., Rubber & Plastic  Prods. 338  0.0158 0.0110 0.0273 0.0190 
Glass, Minerals and Metals  328  0.0181  0.00232  0.0343  0.00331 
Machinery, Equipment and Instrument  685  0.0124 0.00382 0.0222 0.00582 
Medicine and Biological Products 172  0.00693  0.000796  0.0130  0.00147 
Construction    54 0.0133 0.0116 0.0245 0.0214 
Commerce  416  0.0160 0.0166 0.0253 0.0270 
Real  Estate  180 0.00508 0.00294 0.00772 0.00544 
Services  154 0.0109 0.00841 0.0176  0.0130 
Publishing, Motion Pictures and Arts    8  0.00721  0.00771  0.0110  0.0114 
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Table 3.  Main control variables 
 
Variable Definition  Data  source 
Legal 
development 
The first principal component of business or economic lawsuits over provincial 
GDP (in constant yuan) and economic or business lawsuits concluded by the 
province’s courts as a fraction of cases filed. High values indicate and active 
and efficient legal system.  A firm is assigned to the province where its head 
office is situated 
 




An index measuring the degree of bureaucratization, frequency of government 
expropriation, and level of citizen satisfaction with provincial governments. 
 

















An indicator set to one if the firm’s CEO is now or has ever been a bureaucrat 
of the central government, a local government or an industry bureau; and to 
zero otherwise. 
 




An indicator set to one if the firm operates in an industry that requires 
government licence (coal, petroleum, natural gas, water supply, mental, 






An indicator set to one if the firm’s total outstanding long-term loans exceed 





The standard error of the residuals of a regression of log of the firm’s largest 






Total length of all highway, railway, and waterway in the province in kilometres 




Diversification  The number of industry segments in which the firm reports  Corporate Annual 
Reports 
Tobin’s q  Firm market value of firm over assets. Market value is the fiscal year- end 
market value of tradable shares plus the book values of nontradable shares 
and debt. 
CSMAR 
Firm size  The natural logarithm of firm assets. 
 
CSMAR 
Leverage  The ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
 
CSMAR 





The percentage of common shares owned by government if state or party 




Years listed  The number of years since the firm’s IPO. 
 
CSMAR 




Capital  The cumulative annual capital investment, estimated from a perpetual 
inventory model and 7% depreciation rate, in the province from 1984 to 2000. 
China Statistical 
Almanac 
Education  The fraction of the province’s population able to read and write.  China Statistical 
Almanac 
a   CSMAR is China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database, developed by Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
and Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co. Ltd.     52
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics of Other Main Variables 
 
Variables are as defined in Table 3. Samples for firm-level variables are 2,765 firm-year observations 
for 1,052 firms across 2001, 2002, and 2003. Province-level variables have up to 93 province-year 
observations over 31 provinces and in the same three years.  Some data are missing for Tibet, and only one 
year is available for government development.  Price uncertainty is an industry-level variable, defined as the 
standard error of the residuals of a regression of log of the firm’s largest segment’s primary input price on 
a time trend from 1990 to 2001 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Asset specificity & uncertainty        
Price uncertainty  81  0.138 0.134  0.0461  0.0237  0.227 
Transportation infrastructure 93  0.412  0.375  0.292 0.0184  1.45 
Institutional development        
Legal development   92
a 7.19 7.36 2.19  0.000  13.2 
Government development  31  0.0939 0.0963 0.0159 0.0715  0.124 
Market development   93  0.131 0.119  0.0678 0.0386  0.379 
Political connections        
Apparatchik CEO  2,765  0.256 0.00 0.437 0.00  1.00 
Business privilege  2,765  0.121 0.00 0.326 0.00  1.00 
High leverage  2,765  0.497 0.00 0.500 0.00  1.00 
Accountability        
Auditor 2,765  0.0709  0.00 0.257 0.00  1.00 
Other controls        
Firm size  2,765  20.9  20.9 0.835 17.6  26.6 
Diversification 2,765  2.51 2.00 1.45 1.00 12.0 
Years listed  2,765  5.25 5.00 2.67 1.00 17.0 
Per capita GDP  93  0.943  0.657  0.717  0.266  4.07 
a. Tibetan data for 2001 are unavailable.  
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Table 5.  Pearson Correlation of Coefficients 
The vertical integration measures Vmean and Vmax are described in Table 2, and all other variables are described in Table 3.  Numbers in parentheses are p-levels for 
rejecting zero correlation.  All correlations of panel variables are of time-series means.  Correlations are based on a 1,052 firm cross-section except that the correlations 
between province-level variables are based on a 31 province cross-section. To mitigate overstating t-statistic, we multiply the t-statistic (a) by the square root of  
31/1052 for the correlation between a firm-level variable and a province-level variable; (b) by the square root of 81/1052 for the correlation between a firm-level variable 
and an industry-level variable; (c) by the square root of 584/1052 for the correlation between an industry-level variable and a province-level variable.  
 
    Vmean V max  1 2 3 4 5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
 V max  0.994                      
   (0.00)                      
Asset specificity and uncertainty                         
1 Price  uncertainty  0.0674
 b 0.0436
 b                     
    (0.54)  (0.69)                     
2 Transportation  infrastructure  -0.0302
 a -0.0365
 a 0.0911 
c                    
   (0.87)  (0.84)  (0.03)                    
Institutional development                          
3 Legal  development  -0.0710
 a -0.0720
 a 0.0348
c 0.300                   
   (0.69) (0.69)  (0.40) (0.10)                   
4 Government  development  -0.0674
 a -0.0706
 a -0.0040
c  0.469  -0.0307
               
   (0.71) (0.69)  (0.92)  (0.01)  (0.87)              
5 Market  development  -0.0362
 a -0.0390
 a 0.116
c 0.435  0.213
   0.397
             
   (0.84) (0.83)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.25)  (0.03)            
Political connections                          
6  Apparatchik CEO   0.0926 0.0901 0.0183
b -0.0455
a -0.0095
 a -0.0485 
a -0.0714
 a          
   (0.00) (0.00)  (0.87) (0.80) (0.96) (0.79) (0.69)               





 a  0.0057        
   (0.00) (0.00)  (0.22) (0.53) (0.68) (0.55) (0.79)  (0.85)             





 a -0.0106 0.0841      
   (0.04) (0.02)  (0.81) (0.93) (0.99) (0.98) (0.93)  (0.73)  (0.01)       
Accountability                          





 a -0.0094  0.0526 0.0838      
   (0.38) (0.40)  (0.83) (0.21) (0.38) (0.64) (0.29)  (0.76)  (0.09) (0.01)       
Other control variables                       





 a 0.0034 0.247 0.265 0.318     
   (0.07) (0.06)  (0.39) (0.36) (0.81) (0.60) (0.42)  (0.91)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
11 Diversification  0.186 0.174  0.0800




 a -0.0050 0.115  0.0167 -0.0382 0.0393   
   (0.00) (0.00)  (0.47)  (0.60) (0.74) (0.69) (0.55)  (0.87)  (0.00)  (0.59) (0.22) (0.20)     
12 Years  listed -0.0489  -0.0550  0.0929




 a 0.0246  -0.112  0.0138 0.0882 0.0213 0.115   
   (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.40)  (0.13) (0.18) (0.88) (0.13)  (0.43)  (0.00)  (0.65)  (0.00)  (0.49)  (0.00)   















   (0.92)  (0.90)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.70) (0.56)  (0.93)  (0.16) (0.33) (0.53) (0.09) Table 6.  Tobit Regressions of Determinants of Vertical Integration 
Tobit regressions explain vertical integration Vmean, with price uncertainty in the firm’s primary industry, the 
quality of the transportation infrastructure of the province in which it is located, province-level indexes of 
legal development, government development, and market development, our apparatchik CEO dummy for a 
politically well-connected CEO, our business privilege indicators that the firm operates in a heavily regulated 
sector, a  high leverage indicator, firm size (log of total assets), diversification (number industry segments),  
years listed (years since the firm’s IPO),  and the per capita GDP of the firm’s province.  A firm is assumed 
located in the province containing their head office. The sample size is smaller than the full sample because 
of missing legal development data of Tibet in 2001. One, two, or three asterisks denote significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the industry, province and year level, with Z 
statistics are in parentheses. 
Regression 6.1  6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 
Asset specificity & uncertainty       
Price uncertainty  0.107***  0.102*** 0.0991***  0.0940*** 0.103*** 
  (4.41) (4.21) (4.11) (4.21) (4.24) 
Transportation infrastructure  0.0163** 0.0186*** 0.0169** 0.0179*** 0.0184*** 
  (2.37) (2.66) (2.39) (2.58) (2.65) 
-0.117*** -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.116***  Price uncertainty × transportation 
infrastructure  (3.01) (3.11) (2.96) (3.00) (3.13) 
Institutional development       
Legal development    -0.000878** -0.000892** -0.000884** -0.000883**
    (1.98) (1.98) (2.01) (1.99) 
Government development    -0.234*** -0.221*** -0.224*** -0.234*** 
    (3.17) (3.06) (3.19) (3.17) 
Market development    -0.0270*** -0.0262** -0.0280*** -0.0269*** 
    (2.60) (2.46) (2.62) (2.58) 
Political connections       
Apparatchik CEO     0.00693***    
     (4.19)    
Business privilege     0.00467*  
     (1.70)  
High leverage       0.00200 
       (1.61) 
Other controls       
Firm size  0.000639 0.000796 0.000654 0.000373 0.000493 
  (1.09) (1.31) (1.08) (0.64) (0.82) 
Diversification  0.00860*** 0.00865*** 0.00865*** 0.00851*** 0.00864*** 
  (15.45) (15.31) (15.54) (15.36) (15.31) 
Years listed  -0.000613*** -0.000597*** -0.000636*** -0.000533** -0.000611***
  (2.81) (2.73) (2.91) (2.45) (2.78) 
Per capita GDP  -0.000225 0.00261  0.00312*  0.00283 0.00266 
  (0.13) (1.46) (1.72)  (1.58) (1.48) 
Observations  2,765 2,759 2,759 2,759 2,759 
Pseudo R
2   0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10   55
Table 7.  Cross-section Regressions of Determinants of Vertical Integration 
The Tobit regressions in Table 6 are repeated on a single cross-section of data, constructed by 
time-averaging the panel of data for 2001 to 2003 using in Table 6.  Variables are as in that table, 
and are defined in detail in Tables 2 and 3.  One, two, or three asterisks denote significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the industry and province 
level, with Z statistics are in parentheses. 
Regression 7.1  7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 
Asset specificity & uncertainty       
Price uncertainty  0.0821** 0.0791** 0.0749** 0.0695** 0.0799** 
  (2.43) (2.41) (2.32) (2.51) (2.44) 
Transportation infrastructure  0.00798 0.0103 0.00883  0.00971 0.0103 
  (0.85) (1.11) (0.95) (1.06) (1.11) 
-0.0863* -0.0853* -0.0802* -0.0799* -0.0847*  Price uncertainty × transportation 
infrastructure  (1.89) (1.93) (1.80) (1.86) (1.95) 
Institutional development       
Legal development    -0.00131* -0.00135* -0.00132* -0.00132* 
    (1.66) (1.71) (1.68) (1.68) 
Government development    -0.172* -0.166* -0.164* -0.171* 
    (1.70) (1.66) (1.71) (1.69) 
Market development    -0.0283** -0.0271* -0.0292** -0.0282** 
    (2.00) (1.88) (1.97) (1.97) 
Political connections       
Apparatchik CEO     0.00597**    
     (2.51)    
Business privilege      0.00434   
      (0.96)   
High leverage       0.00281 
       (1.29) 
Other controls       
Firm size  0.000815 0.000817 0.000746 0.000410 0.000419 
  (1.17) (1.14) (1.04) (0.58) (0.59) 
Diversification  0.00736*** 0.00742*** 0.00742*** 0.00729*** 0.00740*** 
  (9.30) (9.24) (9.37) (9.29) (9.22) 
Years listed  -0.000422 -0.000411 -0.000455 -0.000351 -0.000422 
  (1.46) (1.35) (1.51) (1.12) (1.39) 
Per capita GDP  0.000806  0.00369 0.00409 0.00385 0.00372 
  (0.30) (1.47) (1.59) (1.51) (1.48) 
Observations  1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
Pseudo R
2   0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
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Table 8.   Regressions of Shareholder Valuation on Vertical Integration   
This table regresses firm valuation on vertical integration, gauged by Vmean. To mitigate potential 
selection effects of vertical integration and auditor choice, we employ a Heckman procedure. We 
include an inverse Mill’s ratio associated with vertical integration, λV,, from the probit in Panel A. 
The dependent variable there is one if Vmean,  ≥ 0.01 and zero otherwise and the independent 
variables are as in Tables 6 and 7.  We also include a second inverse Mill’s ratio, λA, associated 
with auditor choice derived from the probit in Panel B, whose dependent variable is one if the 
firm’s external auditor is ‘Big Four’ and whose independent variables are firm size, defined in 
Table 3, asset structure (current assets over current liabilities), accounts receivable (accounts 
receivable over total assets) and inventories (inventories over total assets). Panel C reports the 
second stage results. Its dependent variable is an approximation of Tobin’s average q ratio –  the 
market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by total assets. Due to the coexistence 
of tradable and non-tradable shares in China, we use the fiscal year-end stock price to compute 
the market value of tradable shares, and use book value to proxy for the value of non-tradable 
shares. Vertical integration, Vmean, is defined in Table 2.  The remaining variables are defined in 
Table 3.  Standard errors are clustered at the industry, province and year level, with Z or t statistics 
are in parentheses in Panels A, B and C, with one, two, or three asterisks denoting significance at 
10%, 5%, or 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A.  First stage probit explaining vertical integration indicator variable, including industry 
and year fixed effects. Sample is 2,759 firm-year observations.   
   Coefficients  Z  value 
Price uncertainty  1.72*  (1.67) 
Transportation infrastructure  0.822***  (2.83) 
Price uncertainty × transportation 
infrastructure 
-3.97***  (2.74) 
Legal development  -0.0121  (0.69) 
Government development  -4.67**  (2.00) 
Market development  -0.980*  (1.85) 
Political connection (Apparatchik CEO)  0.130**  (2.14) 
Firm size  0.0951***  (2.86) 
Diversification  0.412***  (21.07) 
Years listed  -0.0114  (1.06) 




Panel B.   First stage probit explaining auditor indicator variable, including industry and year fixed 
effects. Sample is 2,765 firm-year observations.   
   Coefficients  Z  value 
Firm size  0.654
***  (12.60) 
Asset Structure  0.0495
***  (2.64) 
Accounts Receivable   -0.798  (1.38) 
Inventory -0.0400  (0.11) 
Pseudo R
2 0.18   57
Panel C.  Second stage regressions of shareholder valuation on vertical integration 
 
Regression  8C.1 8C.2 8C.3 8C.4 
Vertical integration      
Vmean  -0.201 0.562 0.267 0.673 
  (0.82) (1.27) (0.61) (1.14) 
λV  0.0383 0.0421 0.0311 0.0463 
  (0.70) (0.76) (0.57) (0.86) 
Accountability      
Auditor    0.222*** 0.213*** 0.220*** 
    (4.92) (4.67) (5.14) 
λA    -0.0251*** -0.0264*** -0.0252*** 
    (3.19) (3.33) (3.14) 
Political connections      






Coefficient   0.0452* 0.0487*  -0.0694*** 
    (1.70) (1.77) (2.90) 
Interactions      
  -1.44** -0.909* -1.09*  Vmean × Political connections  
  (2.47) (1.78) (1.68) 
Vmean× Auditor   0.351  0.173  -2.20 
    (0.14) (0.09) (0.84) 
 3.46  14.2*** 6.65**  Vmean × Auditor × Political 
connections    (1.13)  (3.24) (2.03) 
Controls       
Diversification  -0.000434  0.00316 -0.00118 0.00404 
  (0.03) (0.22) (0.09) (0.29) 
Firm size  -0.334*** -0.367*** -0.377*** -0.358*** 
  (16.8) (17.7) (18.5) (17.1) 
Leverage  0.641*** 0.6470*** 0.644***  0.650*** 
  (7.67) (7.76) (7.72) (7.72) 
Sales growth  -0.00959 -0.00817 -0.00736 -0.00917 
  (0.50) (0.44) (0.39) (0.48) 
State ownership  -0.183*** -0.147** -0.150** -0.153** 
  (2.83) (2.27) (2.33) (2.40) 
Years listed  0.0175*** 0.0141*** 0.0148*** 0.0148*** 
  (3.39) (2.70) (2.84) (2.81) 
Observations  2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 
Adjusted R
2  0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54 
 Table 9.   Regressions of Economy Performance on Vertical Integration  
Dependent variables are either provincial per capita GDP level or growth rate.  Connected firms are defined, alternatively, by having 
political apparatchiks as CEOs, operating in restricted industries, or having above median loans from state banks.  Vertical integration 
intensity among politically connected firms is the mean value of vertical integration of politically connected firms in each province. 
Vertical integration intensity among unconnected firms is defined analogously.  Legal, government, and market development are 
defined as in Table 3, Capital is cumulative annual capital investment from 1984 to 2000 with a depreciation rate of 7%, Education is 
literate population as a fraction of the total in 2001, log per capita GDP is the natural logarithm of 2001 per capita GDP. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics, with one, two, or three asterisks denoting significance at 10%, 5%, or 1%, respectively. Sample is 31 
Chinese provinces and province-level administrative regions. 
 
Regression  9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9  9.10  9.11  9.12 
Connection defined as:  Apparatchik CEO  Business privilege  High leverage 
Performance defined as:  GDP GDP  growth GDP GDP  growth GDP GDP  growth 
Vertical integration              
-2.48 -0.975  -0.481  -0.500* -5.07** -0.880 -0.415 -0.272 -10.6**  -1.76 0.456 0.946  intensity among  
connected firms  (-1.01) (-0.87) (1.66) (-1.72) (-2.16) (-0.62) (-1.11) (-0.63) (-2.11)  (-1.13) (0.54) (0.91) 
-9.64 0.129  4.28*** 4.37* 4.2405 -0.200 3.40** 3.50*  10.3229 0.159 0.208 0.029  intensity among 
unconnected firms  (-0.73) (0.04) (3.07) (2.03) (0.32) (-0.04) (2.12) (1.76) (0.84) (0.03) (0.14) (0.02) 
Institutional development              
  0.00646   -0.00332  0.0105   0.00485  0.0113   0.000395 Legal development 
 (0.22)  (-0.46)  (0.38)  (0.73)  (0.37)  (0.06) 
  3.43   0.449   3.34   0.774   3.67   1.42**  Government development 
 (1.13)  (0.76)  (0.88)  (0.82)  (1.24)  (2.33) 
 0.0553   0.118   -0.0235  0.0331  0.0400   0.128  Market development 
 (0.10)  (0.78)  (-0.04)  (0.16)  (0.08)  (0.67) 
Controls              
Capital   0.809***  0.0672   0.804***   0.0733   0.797***  0.0467 
    (11.6)   (1.03)  (12.1)   (1.00)  (11.9)   (0.74) 
 0.375   0.0302   0.454   0.0664   0.416  -0.167  Education 
 (0.55)  (0.11)  (0.55)  (0.28)  (0.63)  (-0.71) 
    -0.0694     -0.0881     -0.0565 log per capita GDP 
    (-0.97)      (-1.03)      (-0.81) 
Observations  31 31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31 
Adjusted R
2  0.03 0.95 0.26 0.36 0.07 0.95 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.95 0.02 0.18 
 
 